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The discipline of IR was born in a time and place characterised by the consolidation 
of the University as the leading social institution of advanced learning and teaching. This 
contribution addresses two dimensions that can guide our thinking about IR’s socio-
educational impact as delineated and mediated by its University-bound condition, a 
condition that is presumably different from that of other institutions and sites of knowledge-
production and transmission, such as private institutes, professional schools, or think-tanks. 
Each dimension calls for two types of reflection: a socio-historical one that aims to 
understand the situation IR faces within the liberal, public University and vis-à-vis the 
broader public realm; an axiological-normative one that aims to identify the possibilities for 
meaningful socio-academic action. These types of inquiry and their associated discourses 
and objectives are classically opposed, but need not, and should not, be. A sociological 
understanding of IR enables us to negotiate the interconnectedness of what is and what 
ought to be intelligently and responsibly, along the same ‘logic’	  applied against the social 
sciences by political agents who have long understood this interconnectedness and learned 
to use it at our, and society’s, expense.	  
The first point to consider is that the University’s social position and relation to the 
social order are intrinsically ambivalent. The same institution that was notoriously 
irrelevant or resistant to the progressive developments of Europe’s	   ‘enlightenment’ era 
(Anderson 2006: 21) was simultaneously viewed by conservative groups as a space of 
social subversion that, for Hobbes, was ‘as mischievous to [the] Nation as the Wooden 
Horse was to the Trojans’	   (quoted in Gascoigne 1989: 18). Such ambivalence persists to 
this day. In parallel to the consolidation of the University as a progressive and innovative 
social institution serving ‘truth’ and ‘society’, runs the very concrete reality of its role in the 
reproduction of social order(s) and their constitutive hierarchies, inequalities, and 
legitimating ideologies. The sociologies of science and education have explored this 
paradox at the level of national social orders, to unmask the ways these institutions 
functionally contribute to propagating the ideas and dispositions that mediate the 
reproduction of extant social structures and practices. IR has started to explore it at the level 
of the international/global order(s), the realm it inhabits intellectually and pedagogically as 
a discipline itself subjected to global hierarchies. 	  
These sociological studies tell us that as an institutionalized field of knowledge and 
practice IR is the product of structures and processes of local and global order-making and 
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power relations. As shown by Hagmann and Biersteker (2014) in their review of Western 
University IR curricula, teaching practices and programmes mostly tend to reproduce 
conservative and mainstream views rather than ‘reflexive’ ones, and are more likely to 
privilege orientations that are in line with their institutions’ geocultural positions in the 
world. When integrated into a wider perspective that relates these geocultural positions to 
one another and to less privileged positions, it becomes obvious that IR also contributes to 
reproducing global structures of order and hegemony through its own educational practices 
(Tickner and Wæver 2009). These practices are merely the external manifestation of the 
symbolic impact the social order has on our mental structures and representations of it, 
which makes it more efficiently performative of its own ‘truths’ – as feminist and 
postcolonial scholarship has eloquently been demonstrating for decades (see Harding 
1998). It is therefore legitimate to hypothesize that epistemic violence, which is the core 
operating principle of symbolic violence, is at work in similar ways at the national, 
international, and global levels. This is problematic because while one might accept that the 
teaching of world affairs might be more or less naturally governed or pre-determined by 
particularistic, power-based concerns and agendas in such institutions as diplomatic or 
military schools (as illuminated by Lebedeva & Hagmann, and Balzacq in this Forum) the 
same phenomenon takes an entirely different meaning, and has very different social and 
moral implications, in the case of the public University. 
Apart from a general understanding of wide-ranging internal trends, we know much 
more about IR’s role in the reproduction of the global order in/at the ‘periphery’	  –	  where 
the post-positivist-favored problématique of the ‘knowledge-power nexus’ finds its greatest 
and most political exemplification	  – than about everyday macro- and micro-processes of 
social reproduction affecting Western and non-Western societies. These are the processes 
through which University education shapes the generational transmission of dominant 
frames of seeing and valuing, which are traditionally associated with ‘ideology’	  (Althusser, 
2008) and ‘acculturation’. At the global level, while we understand that the reproduction of 
dominant ideas produced by an existing social or international order is likely to reinforce 
dominant practices that sustain and legitimate that order, we still need to understand why 
and how this happens in specific contexts. The corollary of this inquiry is an understanding 
of the University’s role in the mediation of processes of ‘subversion’	   of the existing 
ideational order (i.e. ‘socio-cultural revolutions’), as witnessed, for example, during the 
students movement of the 1960s (Bourdieu 1990): what happens to the ‘dissident’, 
‘subversive’ ideas that are effectively produced through IR scholarship and transmitted to 
new generations through IR university curricula? And more importantly, is such a 
subversive knowledge channeled to society beyond the safely ‘critical’	   walls of the IR 
classroom? Levine and McCourt (2014) have recently asked whether theoretical ‘pluralism’ 
really matters in the discipline if such diversity does not translate into different practical 
political outcomes. One should equally ask whether our scholarly oppositions produce 
different educational practices, and if so, whether the latter also translate into different 
social practices and outcomes.	  
The truth is that we have no answers to such basic questions about IR’s actual 
impact because we still haven’t systematically investigated the processes of circulation and 
concretization of ideas within and across societies – and we need an international sociology 
of knowledge to do so systematically. We could be assuming benefit/harm where there is 
none –	   i.e. assuming relevance where IR is utterly irrelevant or inefficient –	  and ignoring 
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less visible forms of impact embedded in longue-durée societal changes mediated by 
University-based educational frameworks and practices. In other words, our logical-
conceptual understanding of the relations of (dis)similarity between (textbook) ideas in IR 
and ideas in the world is no (dis)proof of their actual relations	   –	   and no amount of 
theoretical debating and argumentation can make these relations more or less real or valid. 
If we rather adopt a realist approach and consider knowledge from a material perspective –	  
as a ‘product’	  and ‘property’	   (Fuller 1992) –	   it becomes possible to empirically track the 
circulation of specialized knowledge from the University into the general political economy 
of symbolic exchanges, and understand the different ways specific worldviews and 
practices ‘translate’	  or not socially into systems of beliefs, dispositions, and skills that can 
be mobilized to produce judgments, actions and long-term, institutionalized practices. 	  
Given the importance accorded to the University as the site of ‘universal’ and ‘critical’ aspirations, one way of problematizing the issue is to consider the effects of the 
disjunction between the University’s internal vocation and its social function. The social 
function whereby the University serves progressive societal needs while operating as a 
stabilizer and pacifier of the social order can be conceptualized in terms of the creation and 
destruction of knowledge as a ‘positional good’	   (as defined by Hirsch 1977: Chap. 3). 
Moving away from the idealist conception of knowledge as a	  ‘public good’	  whose value is 
unaffected by its social distribution and consumption, social epistemologist Steve Fuller 
(2006, 2009) enjoins us to consider the ‘schizoid’	   role that the University plays in the 
creation of social capital	   (in the Bourdieusian sense) through knowledge-production 
(research), and its destruction through knowledge-transmission (teaching). In other words, 
the cognitive innovation that is the heart of the University’s internal vocation creates social 
advantage, i.e. an excess of capital for some, and this advantage is lost as this capital 
becomes more widely distributed through public higher-education. 
Assuming a reasonable functioning of the researcher-teacher and research-led-
teaching models, this process should be studied in order to understand what social 
advantages get passed on or lost through general and specific educational practices, and 
how IR’s content/meaning is transformed, made efficient, or neutralized, in this spatial 
translation from one public realm to the other. What is certain is that this model needs to 
take into account the ways IR travels through the ordered paths of international hierarchy. If 
IR pedagogy perpetuates the institutional and symbolic power of the ‘core’ over the ‘periphery’, as alluded to above, then it is obvious that while the capital of those on the 
receiving end might increase on some individual level, it is simultaneously decreasing on a 
range of collective levels, thereby further enhancing, rather than destroying, the social, 
collective advantages of the producers. Post-colonial societies understand very well how 
their chances at autonomous development are undermined by the systematic cultural 
surrender of their institutions to Western models and influences, whether directly or 
through the education of their elites in the Universities of the ‘metropoles’ (Fanon 2001. For 
insights from postcolonial studies on education, see Kelly and Altbach 1984). In this 
process, the social sciences and humanities are subjected to the opposite logic than that of 
the ‘hard’ and technical sciences, which are protected through patents and rules of 
transmission that often make them inaccessible beyond their production site, precisely 
because the international diffusion of such knowledges destroys the material advantages of 
the producers. But in the case of subject-matters like IR, diffusion translates as enhanced 
advantage – as IR scholars themselves understand in relation to states’ ‘soft power’. In this 
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case, an institutional sociology of IR would need to investigate how IR pedagogy is 
inscribed in the University’s articulation of its internal vocation with its social function of 
stabilizer and pacifier of the global order.	  
Another important question concerns the way this University-bound process of 
creation-destruction of social advantage affects	  ‘criticality’ on both sides of the pedagogical 
relation —	  the criticality of researchers-teachers as well as that of students. But to address 
this notion in equally realist terms beyond our abstract and idealistic conceptions of 
‘critique’,	  ‘critical thought’ and ‘critical thinking’, we need to confront the second important 
paradox of a University-bound intellectual vocation, namely, the fact that the social 
independence and autonomy of the academe, which was won through fierce struggles 
against competing social authorities and groups, has in effect been achieved not merely at 
the price of a greater isolation from the wider public realm, but also at the expense of 
intellectuals’	  social autonomy and subversive potential. Replacing the ‘itinerant workers’	  of 
the ‘Enlightenment’, today’s researchers-teachers are  	  
 
civil servants who, in the first instance, address each other in jealously guarded 
(‘peer-reviewed’) zones of discourse and only then, after that initial filtering 
process, the larger society. Consequently, their potential for incendiary speech has 
been domesticated into reasoned cultural critiques and piecemeal policy advice. 
(Fuller 2009: 22)	  
 
No doubt, this ‘domestication’	  has not fully erased academics’	  ability to pursue and 
transmit genuinely critical/subversive research. It can also be argued that it is this very 
process that enables us to perform our intellectual and pedagogical vocation objectively, 
safely, and for the benefit of all. But as academics who struggle with the neoliberal	  ‘impact 
agenda’	   implicitly and paradoxically understand, the University’s privileged status as a 
social space sufficiently removed from social struggles simultaneously alienates it from the 
pulse, experience, practice, and needs of everyday life. As an alternative to the classical 
Weberian view on the scientific ‘vocation’, I wish to briefly advance two different, related 
arguments in relation to this problem.	  
First, IR scholars who worry about their social role have an interest in reclaiming 
their social autonomy by setting the terms of their situated social relevance. To do so 
requires that the theory-practice problem be addressed anew, this time from a specifically 
praxeological perspective. The recent ‘practice turn’ in IR should expand the praxeological 
posture in the two opposite directions it has so far largely ignored: the level of our 
epistemic reflection, and that of our pedagogical practice. Engaging the first level would 
enable us to reconceptualize	   ‘criticality’	   in terms that are not alienated or abstracted from 
the stuff of social and international experience and practice, and that can hence respond, 
through an engagement at the second (pedagogical) level, to the cognitive and practical 
needs of real social agents and groups confronting real social problems. This entails 
rethinking the relation of research and teaching, and seriously considering the advantages of 
a reversed, teaching-led-research paradigm of academic practice, whereby criticality is 
constantly gauged in relation to the socio-historically situated life experience of new 
generations of learners, and theory is informed by the challenges that arise from 
differentiated experiences of the global. Without such a praxeological posture, IR will keep 
ignoring, for example, the fact that when traveling beyond their production sites, so-called 
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‘critical’ approaches can have negative effects on the cultural and practical autonomy of 
students and elites of the ‘periphery’, while ‘mainstream’ approaches can better help them 
confront the logic of hegemonic threats directed at their societies.	  
Second, we need to move beyond the analytical discussion of the relation of facts to 
values/norms, and science to politics, which distorts our understanding of science’s actual 
social function and effects. That a reasonably objective socio-historical understanding of 
the world leads to value-preferences and normative choices rather than political or ethical 
‘neutrality’	   is something that ‘political man’	  has discovered long before any sophisticated 
philosophical discussion of the alleged nature and antagonism of ‘descriptive’ and 
‘prescriptive’ claims about reality. I suggest that the history of the (neoliberal) political 
establishment’s efforts to constrain the development, visibility, and socio-educational 
impact of the social sciences whenever their critical role of unmasking objective structures 
of social reproduction, control, and domination starts to bear its fruits is the historical-
pragmatic indicator of the relation between objective knowledge and political values and 
norms. A socio-historical understanding of the conditions of possibility, nature, and impact 
of our own institutional condition is therefore a necessary and sufficient step for delineating 
a morally and politically meaningful pedagogical and social practice. 	  
This is the wider project and promise that a sociology of IR holds for the discipline 
and its members: to better understand our condition and practice within the University, 
society, and the global order, so that we rise to the challenges of our ‘vocation’. But as far as 
pedagogy is concerned, the ultimate question for us remains: can an IR curriculum truly 
pose any serious threat or danger to existing global structures of power-knowledge? If it 
cannot, is teaching IR an endeavor worth pursuing at all beyond the training of a limited 
class of future civil servants involved in the management of world politics, regardless of 
our idealist attachment to abstract conceptions of social utility, critique, and progress? 	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